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Abstract
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines production and use estimates
that there are more than 80 billion landmines in the ground in more than 80 coun-
tries. Despite the scale of the problem and large investments by OECD countries
to clear mines in low income countries, the economic consequences of landmine
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1contamination have been so far unexamined by economists working on the eco-
nomics of wars, perhaps due to the lack of data thus far. This paper exploits
a unique dataset on landmine contamination intensity covering 126 Mozambi-
can districts. Because landmines (unlike other weapons) are used as a weapon
of choice to protect territories, the empirical strategy uses an indicator of dis-
tance to strategic borders as an instrumental variable to correct for selection
in landmine placement. Instrumental variables estimates indicate a large eﬀect
of landmine contamination on poverty and consumption several years after the
ceaseﬁre. Hence, despite the very high cost to clear a mine a conservative cost-
beneﬁt evaluation of the national demining program indicates that the program
generates a large positive return.
JEL codes: O1, O55
1 Introduction
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines production and use estimates that
there are more than 80 billion landmines in the ground in more than 80 countries.
Mozambique is among the most severely aﬀected countries (in terms of both the number
of mines and the size of the land area contaminated) along with Angola, Afghanistan,
Cambodia and Vietnam. Cambodia with a population of 10 million has between 4 and
6 million landmines on the ground. In Afghanistan, it has been estimated that 88 per
cent of the land is unusable due to landmine contamination. In some parts of Angola
landmines have reduced food production by more than 25 per cent (Landmine Monitor
2Report, several years).
Landmines may be considered a serious threat to long-term development and post-
war recovery. They adversely aﬀect agricultural development, human capital develop-
ment and often block access to public infrastructure (roads, schools, power line, water
plants, dams). Landmines have removed vast areas of land and resources from produc-
tive use. As more agricultural land is taken out of production, regions which were once
self-suﬃcient become dependent upon outside sources for their food. In addition, the
mining of irrigation systems and water-delivery plants adversely aﬀects productivity
in mine-free regions. Impoverishment is also reﬂected in the depreciation of assets
caused by the presence of mines. In the absence of valuable assets, access to credit is
restricted which reduces investments in new technologies and fertilizer. This in turn
hampers productivity and agricultural growth.
Landmines are one of the most widely used weapons in contemporary conﬂicts be-
cause they are cheap to buy and proﬁtable to sell. Despite the growing awareness within
the international community that what has come to be known as the "global landmine
crisis" has far-reaching consequences on development, eﬀort to clear landmines is tak-
ing place in only 34 countries. A major factor explaining such under-investment in
landmine clearance is probably the cost: while a landmine costs about 3 dollars to pro-
d u c e ,a c c o r d i n gt ot h eU Nm i n ea c t i o np r o g r a m ,i tc o s t sb e t w e e n3 0 0t o1 0 0 0d o l l a r s
to clear a mine. As a consequence policymakers in landmined countries often argue
that investing in landmine clearance cannot yield a positive return. This may be the
case because landmines remain active for a limited time varying between 25 to 50 years
3(see Landmine Impact reports).
Most landmine clearance programs are ﬁnanced by OECD countries through bilat-
eral or multilateral assistance. Landmine clearance assistance has followed a steady
upward trend during the last ten years with a rapid acceleration started in 1999 with
the signature by hundreds of countries of a Treaty to Ban Landmine Use and Produc-
tion. The European Community (EC) assistance amounted to 42 million Euro in 2002,
a 48 per cent increase relative to the previous year. The US remains the largest aid
donor with about 80 million USD allocated to 37 countries worldwide. Between 1993
and 2002 the US invested 560 million USD in mine action assistance of all forms: demi-
ning, technical assistance, mine action education and so on so forth (Source: Landmine
Monitor Report issues 1999 to 2003). Both the US and EC mine action programs ex-
pect to include an increasing number of countries in the coming years. In 2002, the top
recipients were Afghanistan ($ 64.4 million); Iraq ($30.6 million) ; Cambodia ($ 27.3
million) and Mozambique ($ 18 million). For Afghanistan demining assistance from
the EC and US represents about 15 per cent of total Overseas Development Assistance
funds received. Despite growing donors assistance to clear landmines there is scant
empirical evidence on the economic impact of landmine contamination to assess the
cost-eﬀectiveness of these large interventions.
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature on the economic consequences
of wars and conﬂicts. Recent contributions to this literature include Miguel and Roland
(2005), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and La Ferrara and Guidolin (2005). Miguel
and Roland (2005) evaluate the long term economic impact of US bombing in Vietnam
4and ﬁnd no eﬀect of U.S. bombing on poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure,
literacy or population density through 2002. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) use the
event study approach to study the relationship between civil war, per capita output
and private investment in the context of terrorism in the Basque Country. Similarly, La
Ferrara and Guidolin (2005) exploit the sudden end of the conﬂict in Angola to study
the relationship between civil war and the value of ﬁrms. The economic consequences
of landmine contamination have been so far largely unexamined by economists working
o nt h ei m p a c to fw a r so nd e v e l o p m e n tp e r h a p sd u et ot h el a c ko fd a t at h u sf a r .H e r eI
use a unique dataset on the incidence of landmine contamination covering 126 districts
of Mozambique.
Mozambique oﬀers an ideal setting for this study for several reasons. First of all,
the data necessary for the analysis including measures of landmine contamination,
information on the national demining program and variables of economic performance
were readily available and all measured at district level. Second, Mozambique is one of
the rare countries to have adopted a clearance program immediately after the end of the
conﬂi c ti te x p e r i e n c e d .T h i r d ,M o z a m b i q u ei so n eo ft h em o s th e a v i l ym i n e dc o u n t r i e s
and (as a consequence) one of the top aid recipient. It is estimated that mine action
funding for Mozambique totalled $ 177 million from 1993-2002 (Landmine Monitor
Report 2003). Concerning the choice to focus on a single country, it is motivated by
the fact that problems of omitted variables are likely to be less than in a cross-country
sample because sub-regions within a country are more similar with regard to observable
and unobservable characteristics.
5The ordinary least squares (OLS) method may be inadequate to identify causal
eﬀects of landmine contamination intensity on welfare due to potential selection in
landmine placement and measurement error. To address this issue, an instrumental
variables (IV) approach is applied using as instrument a measure of the distance to
regions heavily mined by both factions for purely strategic reasons related to military
actions i.e. the borders with Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania. IV estimates are found
to be much larger than OLS estimates consistently with the presumption that more
mines where led in more economically developed regions. The point estimate implies
that a change from the average landmine contamination intensity to zero is associated
with a 10.63 percentage points fall in the poverty rate.
I then use the estimate of the average impact of landmine contamination intensity
on the daily consumption per capita to derive the beneﬁt of the landmine clearance
program. Under conservative assumptions on the length of the beneﬁtp e r i o d ,t h e
beneﬁt appears to largely outweighed the total cost of the national demining program
over the period 1993-2004.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a historical
overview of the war and landmine use in Mozambique. Section III describes the data.
Section IV develops the identiﬁcation strategy. Section V discusses the results. Section
VI reports the cost-beneﬁt evaluation of the National Demining Program. Section VII
concludes the paper.
62T h e C o n t e x t 1
Mozambique today has a total population of 17.6 million. It is estimated that 64 per
cent of the population lives oﬀ subsistence agriculture and that 2/3 of the population
is in absolute poverty. The mean monthly consumption is today around 9.4 USD.
Armed opposition to the Portuguese began in 1964, led by the Mozambican Liber-
ation Front (henceforth, FRELIMO). The Portuguese withdrew and granted control to
F R E L I M Oi n1 9 7 4 ,w h i c hi n s t i t u t e dao n e - party Marxist system. Around 1976 Mozam-
bican National Resistance (henceforth, RENAMO), an opposition group supported by
South Africa, initiated a violent insurrection against FRELIMO.
South Africa had an interest in destabilizing Mozambique for many political reasons.
In 1980, the white minority government in South Africa anticipated problems resulting
from a situation in which they were increasingly surrounded by hostile neighbors. A
destabilized Mozambique allowed them to maintain their political and economic hege-
mony over the region (Vines, 1994).
The country emerged from a long and brutal war at the end of 1992 with the
distinction of being one of the poorest countries in the world. The war inﬂicted about
18 billion dollars worth of damage in a country where the GNP was less than two
Billion (Willett, 1995). It had an enormous human, capital and economic impact,
in terms of death, disability, displacement, and trauma suﬀered by the population. In
addition, the war destroyed the social and economic infrastructure, including hospitals,
1This section heavily relies on Heynen et al (2003), Vines (1994,1997), and Landmine Impact survey
report (2003) at http://www.sac-na.org/surveys_mozambique.html.
7trading posts, schools, roads, bridges, railways and energy facilities. An estimated 58
per cent of the existing 5886 primary schools in Mozambique were destroyed or forced
to close during the war. Of the 1,195 health posts in 1985, 500 were closed or destroyed.
Warfare often resulted in the wholesale destruction of villages and landmines were used
indiscriminately to deny people access to their farms and other means of survival.
Landmines constitute the primary obstacle to the reconstruction and development
in Mozambique. Although systematic use of landmines in Mozambique occurred as
far back as 1965 in the conﬂict between the Portuguese and FRELIMO, FRELIMO
and RENAMO laid the majority of landmines between 1978 and 1990 (Vines, 1997).
Many tactics determined the placement of mines, including the random deployment of
mines and the deliberate targeting of civilian populations (Vines, 1994). Because of
the need to protect their land-based interests from the RENAMO insurgency, FRE-
LIMO used landmines for defensive purposes. In many cases, initial mine ﬁelds were
laid around strategic installations, but often these proved inadequate against attacks.
Hence, FRELIMO in many cases continued to add to sites until large areas extending
well beyond the immediate perimeter of installations were protected. In doing so, they
often disrupted large parcels of arable land as well as important transportation routes
(Heynen et al, 2003). As part of a larger-scale strategy, FRELIMO laid many mines
along its border with South Africa during the 1980s fearing increased collaboration
between RENAMO and South African forces (Vines, 1994).
Alternatively, RENAMO laid mines primarily in an attempt to devastate the gov-
ernment’s economy. RENAMO frequently mined commonly used roads in order to slow
8and divert troop movement, as well as to stop deliveries of military goods and trans-
port of agricultural produce. In order to attack troops directly, RENAMO laid mines
in large rural tracts that were used for troop movement and food collection and pro-
duction. Airﬁelds used by the government were also mined in order to further prevent
the movement of people and goods (Heynen et al, 2003). According to the Mozam-
bique landmine impact survey (MLIS), landmines currently aﬀect all 10 provinces of
Mozambique and 123 out of 128 districts. This is apparent in Map 1 which maps the
area contaminated by district per 10.000 km2. According to the same survey, at least
1.5 million persons, representing no less than nine per cent of the national population
in 1997, live close to a landmined area. In addition, landmines frequently block access
to agricultural land; roads; and non-agricultural land used for hunting, gathering ﬁre-
wood, and other economic and cultural purposes. A total of 2,145 landmine victims is
recorded among which 172 had come to harm during the two years preceding the sur-
vey. Male outnumbered female by a factor of almost three to one. The most frequently
represented victims age groups were from the working age population; 30 to 59 years
among women (62.1% of female victims) and from 15 to 44 years among men (57.4% of
male victims). Individuals who survive a landmine accident most often suﬀer from ir-
reversible trauma. Although it is diﬃcult to precisely record the number of people who
have been injured by landmines (due to under-reporting especially in highest mined
areas), the estimated number of amputees for Mozambique ranges between 9,000 and
12,000 and children represent a non-negligible share of these victims (Landmine Impact
Reports UN). Children with disabilities who are excluded from education are virtually
9certain to be life-long poor.
3T h e D a t a
The main dependent variables investigated in the paper are: the poverty headcount
index, the poverty gap and daily per-capita consumption obtained from the Interna-
tional Food Policy Institute who was exceptionally granted access to the household
survey (IFPRI, Simler, K., and V. Nhate (2002)2). These indicators, all measured at
district level, have been computed by using consumption data from the 1996 household
survey. The National statistics Oﬃce of Mozambique usually does not grant access to
the survey. The survey is a multi-purpose household and community survey, in the
same vein as the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys,
and was designed and implemented by the National Institute of Statistics. The data
collection took place from February 1996 through April 1997, covering 8,250 households
living throughout Mozambique. The sample is designed to be nationally representative,
as well as representative of each of the ten provinces, the city of Maputo, and along
the rural/urban dimension. It is the ﬁrst survey of living conditions in Mozambique
with national coverage, and is the only national survey that measures welfare using
comprehensive income or expenditure data. Two indicators of poverty are used: the
poverty gap (PG) and the headcount index (HI). The later measures the share of a
district population living under the poverty line (one dollar a day). The former is
2I refer to their paper for a detailed description of how these indicators were derived using the 1996
household survey.
10the mean distance separating the population from the poverty line (with the non-poor
being given a distance of zero), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The
poverty gap ratio (PGR) is the sum of the income gap ratios for the population below
the poverty line, divided by the total population; hence it is a measure of the depth of
poverty. The consumption measure includes food and nonfood items, acquired through
home production, market purchases, transfers, or payments in kind. Consumption also
includes the imputed use value of household durables, and an imputed rental value for
owner-occupied housing3.
Landmine contamination intensity is also measured at district level by the fraction
of land contaminated (per 10000 km2) in 1996. The data are available from the National
demining Institute. I use district level data because data at a more disaggregated level
are not available but also because this choice allows to reduce bias from spillover eﬀect
whereby landmine contamination in one region would also aﬀect neighboring regions.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis.
4I d e n t i ﬁcation Strategy
S e v e r a le l e m e n t sh i g h l i g h t e di nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o ns u g g e s tt h a tl a n d m i n e sw e r en o t
randomly placed which renders an ordinary least squares approach inadequate to iden-
tify the causal eﬀect of landmine contamination on welfare (e.g. poverty). Indeed, in
such a framework, landmine contamination and poverty will be spuriously negatively
3See Simler, K., and V. Nhate (2002) for details.
11correlated if more landmines were led in more fertile lands. A way to correct for en-
dogeneity is to exploit an exogenous source of variation in landmine contamination
intensity. I use an indicator of distance to the borders heavily mined by both factions
for purely strategic reasons as an instrumental variable for landmine contamination
intensity. Unlike other weapons, landmines are often used as a weapon of choice to
protect borders. During the war the governmental forces (FRELIMO) heavily mined
the border areas with Zimbabwe and South Africa to counter rebels inﬁltration while
on the other side, the rebels (RENAMO) heavily mined the borders with Malawi and
Tanzania to harm the ﬂows of refugees. Relative to the extreme east and west bor-
ders, these areas are relatively centrally located. This suggests a non-linear inverted
U-shaped relationship between the districts’ longitude and landmine contamination
intensity. This is conﬁrmed in Table 2 which reports the regression of landmine con-
tamination intensity on the longitude squared with and without geographical controls
(i.e. elevation, average rainfall precipitation in 1996, a coast dummy, latitude and
longitude) in column (1) and (2) respectively. This represents the ﬁrst stage of a two-
stage-least-squares estimation of the impact of landmine contamination intensity on
welfare where the excluded instrument in the second stage is the longitude squared.
5 Results
Poverty Table 3 column (1) reports the OLS and IV estimates of the impact
of a 1/10000 fraction of contaminated land on poverty measured by the headcount
12index. All regressions include a full set of geographical controls. The OLS estimate
is signiﬁcant statistically but suggests a very marginal relationship between landmine
contamination intensity and poverty. The IV estimate is much larger than the OLS
estimate which is consistent with the presumption that more mines were led in more
prosperous regions and with the fact that measurement error biases OLS estimates
downwards. The IV estimate has the expected sign, is statistically signiﬁcant at stan-
dard levels and relatively large in magnitude. The point estimate implies that a change
from the average landmine contamination intensity to zero is associated with a 10.63
percentage points fall in the fraction of people living under the poverty line. This is
a large but reasonable estimate given that the headcount index sample mean is 70
per cent. The poverty rate is a rather crude measure of poverty and so I also use the
poverty gap as a measure of poverty. The result is conﬁrmed. This means that clearing
landmines in Mozambique would contribute to reducing both the level and the depth
of poverty.
Consumption The average eﬀect of landmine contamination intensity on the
daily per capita consumption is also very large. While the OLS estimate suggests
again a very small average eﬀect, the IV estimate implies that going from zero to the
average landmine contamination intensity translates into a 1395.11 mt (local currency)
decrease in the daily per capita consumption. This is a very large eﬀect representing
about 27 per cent of the actual mean daily consumption per capita.
13Transmission Channels T a b l e4r e p o r t sf u r t h e re v i d e n c eo nt h ei m p a c to fl a n d -
mine contamination with the aim of highlighting possible transmission mechanisms.
Unfortunately without access to the household survey containing information on house-
holds access to public services and infrastructure this exercise cannot be carried out
in detail but here I consider some additional outcomes that are possibly relevant: the
female-to-male ratio, the average family size, the number of ﬁrms in the district, the
number of employees working in these ﬁrms and the size of these ﬁrms´businesses.
Given the small number of mine victims recorded so far relative to the aggregate pop-
ulation one expects the population structure to be altered mostly through migration
eﬀects and this may be reﬂected in variations in sex ratios. The number of ﬁrms lo-
cated in a district and their size is also worth examining because one could presume
that ﬁrms will have a higher incentive to locate in districts oﬀering a better access to
public services and infrastructure. Given that one major eﬀect of land mines is blocked
access to infrastructure (in particular roads and bridges) this is a relevant outcome to
consider here.
The impact of landmine contamination intensity on the sex ratio is insigniﬁcant
statistically. If one expected landmine contamination to alter the family structure
through male migration then this result suggests that landmine contamination is as-
sociated with insigniﬁcant migration ﬂows across districts4.I a l s o ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the average family size and population density. This result is somehow re-
4Short distance migration i.e. within districts and international migration of refugees to neighboring
countries may have been larger.
14assuring because a recurrent issue in program evaluation is that OLS estimates can
be biased due to migration selectivity. If the war caused selective migration this in-
troduces a (non-classical) measurement error into the outcome variables. The total
eﬀect of landmine contamination would include (i) the direct eﬀect of mines in the
original, resident population; (ii) the change in the outcome variables caused by the
compositional change in the population via migration that is induced. In this case the
eﬀect of interest is only given by the ﬁrst term, if all pre-contamination site populations
have the same mean characteristics or if the pre-contamination site population is rep-
resentative (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988)). Based on these results however, I ﬁnd no
evidence that migration ﬂows have been large enough across districts to signiﬁcantly
alter the conclusions drawn so far.
In the third to ﬁfth columns I report results for the number of ﬁrms located in
a district and indicators of ﬁrms size. The estimates are all insigniﬁcant statistically
which may be explained by the fact that while landmines were led mostly in rural areas
these ﬁrms are located mostly in urban areas. Hence, these results provide good control
experiments.
6 Comparing Costs and Beneﬁts of the National
Demining Program
In 1992 Mozambique initiated a demining program mostly ﬁnanced through aid received
from OECD countries. The National Demining Institute (IND) is a semi-autonomous
15governmental institute reporting directly to the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, which
coordinates all mine clearance activities in the country. A total of about 58 million
square meters of land was cleared from 1993 to 2004 at a cost of about 96 million
dollars.
The estimates of the average impact of mine contamination on the consumption
per capita can be used to compare the cost of demining and the additional wealth
generated by the demining program. The program yearly cost is given by the aggregate
aid received each year since the program is almost entirely ﬁnanced through aid; the
government contribution is negligible. It includes all forms of assistance i.e. technical
or purely ﬁnancial.
Several assumption are needed for the calculation of the program’s discounted net
present value. Given that most mines remain active for periods varying between 25
and 50 years I will report results assuming the program generates beneﬁts over 25
and 50 years. In addition, I assume a 5 per cent yearly discount rate and report all
monetary variables in 2004 USD. I assume a zero population growth over time because
the marginal eﬀect may not be the same in the long-run on a larger population.
So, the program beneﬁt is calculated as follows:









d is the total area decontaminated during the period 1993-2004 as a
fraction of the country surface multiplied by 10000. α is the estimated average eﬀect
of 1/10000 of contaminated land on the daily consumption per capita (=0.39 dollar).
16P is the population in 2004. The beneﬁt is then multiplied by 365 to get the yearly
beneﬁt.
I compute the present beneﬁt value and compare it to the immediate cost. The
results of this exercise are reported in Table 5. As can be seen, whatever the assumption
made on the length of the beneﬁt period the net beneﬁt is very large.
This analysis however has to be taken cautiously for at least three reasons. Firstly,
if demining causes an increase in income, households could choose to save or invest
rather than consume the additional wealth generated by the program. This would in
turn result into a long-term growth eﬀect. In this case the approach used undervalues
the program’s beneﬁt. Secondly, a cost-beneﬁt analysis of the demining program based
on cross-section estimates of the eﬀect of landmine contamination is relevant if the
p r o g r a m ´ si m p a c ti si m m e d i a t ea n di fi t sd i s t r i b u t i o n a le ﬀects are not important. Given
that landmines are active for a limited time, if for some reason the program’s impact
takes several years to materialize, its proﬁtability would fall dramatically. People may
not adjust immediately to the program due to psychological factors or because the
returns from (new) investments in cleared areas take time to materialize. Addressing
this issue would require ideally a dynamic framework and unfortunately the required
data are not available for most developing countries including Mozambique. Thirdly,
if the instrumental variables approach does not fully isolate the impact of landmine
contamination from the impact of other war damages correlated with it, the beneﬁto f
clearing mines may be over-valued to an undetermined extent.
177C o n c l u s i o n
The paper has provided evidence on the economic consequences of civil wars in the con-
text of landmine contamination in Mozambique. The evaluation used aggregate data
covering 126 districts and corrected for endogeneity using an instrumental variables
framework. The identiﬁed causal eﬀect of war on poverty and consumption several
years after the cease-ﬁre is sizeable and statistically signiﬁcant. This result is in con-
trast with several recent inconclusive evaluations of the long term impact of war in
developing countries e.g. Miguel and Roland (2005) study of Vietnam one of the most
heavily mined countries in the world. One conclusion of this paper is that improv-
ing households access to infrastructure andl a n dt h r o u g hm i n ec l e a r a n c ei sl i k e l yt o
generate large returns and therefore considerably boost recovery in countries emerging
from wars. Despite the high investments required to clear landmines I also show that
such interventions may generate large net beneﬁts provided the programs are imple-
mented early enough after the conﬂict and designed to target regions really in need of
assistance.
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Map1 Proportion of Land Surface Cleared from Landmines from 1996-




Daily per capita Consumption (in 
Metical) 126 5 108 1 634,23 1534,82 13108,39
Headcount Index 126 70,5 13,7 22,8 98,6
Poverty Gap 126 32,7 12,3 6,9 72,6
Area landmined per 10000 126 0,319 0,9 0 5,793
Table 2: First Stage results for IV  
Dependent variable: Area landmined per 10 000 km2
coefficient on (1) (2)
Instrument -0,008*** -0,02**
Longitude Squared  (0,0004) (0,011)
Geographical controls no yes
Nbr.Obser. 126 126
R-squared 0,03 0,17
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significant at 90 (*), 95 (**), 99 (***) percent confidence 
Geographical controls include elevation, latitude, longitude, rainfall precipitation and a coastal
dummyTable 3: Effect of Landmine Contamination on Poverty and Consumption  




OLS  1,81** 1,27 -187,16*
Area landmined per 10000  (0,89) (0,83) (108,74)
IV 33,33* 25,71* -4373,4*
Predicted Area landmined per 
10000  (18,92) (14,75) (2534,14)
Nbr.Obser. 126 126 126
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significant at 90 (*), 95 (**), 99 (***) percent confidence 
All regressions include geographical controls i.e. elevation, latitude, longitude, rainfall precipitation and a coastal
dummy












Area landmined per 10000  1,49* 0,008 3,11 -0,05 -0,05 -0,055
(0,87) (0,065) (4,06) (0,08) (0,152) (0,113)
IV
Predicted Area landmined per 
10000  -3,43 -0,35 -19,6 -1,58* -1,33 -0,508
(4,96) (0,32) (28,39) (0,95) (0,95) (1,061)
Nbr.Obser. 126 126 126 126 126 126
Note robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significant at 90 (*), 95 (**), 99 (***) percent confidence 
All regressions include geographical controls i.e. elevation, latitude, longitude, rainfall precipitation and a coastal dummyTable 5: Cost-Benefit Analysis
Assumptions 
Interest Rate  5%
Area cleared 1993-2004 58 km2
Country surface 801 590 km2
Clearance Cost 1993-2004 96 Million USD
Population in 2004 19792000
Exchange Rate Metical per Dollar 11293,8
Discount Period  50 years
Present benefit value in dollars 37 billion USD
Discount Period  25 Years
Present benefit value in dollars 28,5 billion USD